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Responsiveness and Robustness in the
David Lewis Signaling Game
Carl Brusse and Justin Bruner*y
We consider modifications to the standard David Lewis signaling game and relax a num-
ber of unrealistic implicit assumptions that are often built into the framework. In par-
ticular, we motivate and explore various asymmetries that exist between the sender and
receiver roles. We find that endowing receivers with a more realistic set of responses sig-
nificantly decreases the likelihood of signaling, while allowing for unequal selection pres-
sure often has the opposite effect. We argue that the results of this article can also help
make sense of a well-known evolutionary puzzle regarding the absence of an evolution-
ary arms race between sender and receiver in conflict-of-interest signaling games.
1. Signaling Games and Evolution. Common interest signaling games
were introduced by David Lewis (1969) as a game theoretic framework that
treats communicative conventions as solutions to coordination problems. In
recent years, this has informed a growing body of work on the evolution of
communication, incorporating signaling games into an evolutionary game
theoretic approach to modeling the evolution of communication and coop-
eration in humans (Skyrms 1996, 2010).
As the basis for such work, Lewis signaling games are attractive in their
intuitive simplicity and clear outcomes. They are coordination games be-
tween world-observing senders and action-making receivers using costless
signals, in contrast to games where interests may differ and where costly sig-
nals are typically invoked. In the standard two-player, two-state, two-option
Lewis signaling game (the ‘2  2  2 game’), the first agent (signaler) ob-
serves that the world is in one of two possible states and broadcasts one of
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two possible signals that are observed by the second agent (receiver) who per-
forms one of two possible actions. If the act chosen by the receiver matches
the underlying state of the world, both agents receive a greater payoff than
otherwise.
Most important, though, the game theoretic results are unequivocal. There
exist twoNash equilibria that are, in Lewis’s words, signaling systems, where
senders condition (otherwise arbitrary) signaling behavior on the state of the
world, and receivers act on those signals so as to secure the mutual payoff.
The two systems only differ on which signal is associated with each state
of the world.1 Huttegger (2007) and Pawlowitsch (2008) have shown that
under certain conditions a signaling system is guaranteed to emerge under
the replicator dynamics, a standard model of evolution further discussed in
section 4.
Of course the degree to which Lewis’s approach makes sense is to some
extent determined by the level of confidence we have in the interpretation
and application of such idealized models to the more complex target systems
(such as animal and human communication). Thus, one obvious worry is
that by introducing more realistic features into the model, one may break or
significantly dilute previous findings on the evolution of signaling.
Not surprisingly, then, recent work on Lewis signaling games has inves-
tigated the many ways in which such de-idealizations could occur and tested
the robustness of signaling in the face of them. Some deviations from the
standard Lewis signaling game include more and varied states of the world,
the possibility of observational error or signal error, noisy signals, the intro-
duction of a partial conflict of interest between senders and receivers, the
reception of more than one signal, and so on. Many such concerns are dealt
with favorably by Skyrms (2010) and in work by others. For example,
Bruner et al. (2014) generalize beyond the 2  2  2 case, while Godfrey-
Smith and Martinez (2013) and Martinez and Godfrey-Smith (2016) mix
signaling games of common interest and conflict of interest. One result (par-
ticularly important for our purposes) is that signaling systems are not guar-
anteed in the simple 2  2  2 case when ‘nature is biased’. In other words,
when the probabilities of the world being in one state or the other are not
equal, a pooling equilibrium in which no communication occurs between
sender and receiver is evolutionarily significant (Huttegger 2007; Pawlo-
witsch 2008).
2. Symmetry Breaking. Our article will focus on the idealization that
senders and receivers are equally responsive in strategic settings. Senders
and receivers (in the evolutionary treatment of such games) are two popula-
1. There also exist a class of ‘pooling equilibria’ that involve the receiver performing an
act unconditionally.
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tions of highly abstract and constrained agency roles: all that signalers do
upon observing the state of the world is send a signal, and the receivers choose
to act as though the world is in one of the two possible sender-observable
states. Of those two roles, it is the restriction on receivers that appears to
be particularly unrealistic.
Imagine, for example, a forager sighting a prey animal at a location inac-
cessible to her, but close enough to be acquired by an allied conspecific (who
cannot observe the animal). In this case, it is easy for the first forager to slip
into the signaling role and execute it, whistling or gesturing to her counter-
part. To play the receiver role, however, the second forager has to actually
reorient his attention (to some degree) and attempt to engage in appropriate
behavior for the world-state the first has observed (e.g., prey is to the east or
to the west).
The Lewis signaling model by design is constrained such that the receiv-
er’s actions are limited to just those acts associated with the sender’s ob-
served world-states. It is of course sensible to begin inquiry with as simple
of a model as possible and consider a limited range of responses to stimuli.
However, our point is that it is more plausible to make these idealizations for
signalers than for receivers. Signals are (by stipulation) cheap and easy to
send, yet the actions available to the receiver are less plausibly interpreted as
intrinsically cheap and free of opportunity cost.
In addition, the informational states drawn on by sender and receiver are
also likely to be very different. Any real-life sender’s observation of a world
state will likely inform her motivations (‘we should catch that animal’) to
dictate a fairly clear course of action (‘try to direct the other agent’s behav-
ior’). But all the receiver gets is a whistle, gesture, or other signal that (by
stipulation) has no preestablished meaning. The experience of observing a
strategically relevant state of the world will typically be richer and more de-
tailed than that of observing a strategically relevant artificial signal.
All this leads to two concerns. First, asymmetries in the strategic situa-
tions are likely to exist between senders and receivers. Receivers are likely
to have locally reasonable options available to them other than those rele-
vant to signaler-observed states of the world, and their responsiveness to the
strategic situation is therefore less satisfactorily modeled by the strictly sym-
metric payoff structures of standard signaling games. Call this the structural
responsiveness concern.
Second, given the likely differences in informational states, goal direct-
ness, workload, and opportunity cost between sender and receiver roles, we
can expect the mechanisms (cognitive and otherwise) that instantiate them
to differ as well, quantitatively and qualitatively. This implies that we should
not expect the update responsiveness between sender and receiver to be
equal either. Yet the working evolutionary assumption is that senders and re-
ceivers update their strategies in an identical manner, modeled using either
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learning dynamics or replicator dynamics. Call this the evolutionary respon-
siveness concern.
3. Hedgehog Strategies and Update Asymmetry. The first of these con-
cerns might sound like an argument for abandoning coordination games and
moving toward ‘conflict of interest’ or ‘partial conflict of interest’ models.
However, the issue is more specific than this.
The structural responsiveness concern provides parallel motivation to
one of Sterelny’s (2012) worries about Skyrms’s (2010) use of the Lewis
model. Sterelny asks whether the availability of ‘third options’ on the part
of the receiver might undermine the evolution of signaling even when these
third options are less valuable than the payoff for successful coordination.
As part of a discussion of animal threat responses, he labels this a ‘hedge-
hog’ strategy, for it provides the agent with an action that pays off modestly
regardless of the state of the world. To make this concrete, hedgehogs often
roll into a ball in response to predators. This is a stark contrast to the more
sophisticated behavior of vervets, who have specific responses to specific
threats. Yet the optimal response a vervet takes to one threat—climb a tree
when confronted by a leopard—may lead to total disaster when used in re-
sponse to another threat, such as an eagle. Hedgehogs avoid such outcomes
by ‘hedging’ unconditionally so as to secure a modest payoff. Translated to
signaling games, such a gambit may, in many cases, be more attractive than
attempting to respond optimally to a signal.2
Sterelny’s ‘hedgehog’ strategy compliments the structural responsiveness
concern: receivers (especially) might have other options of value that will
stand in competition to those assumed in the standard signaling game. Some-
thing like these hedgehog strategies is a plausible departure from the ideal-
ization of the baseline Lewis signaling game and better captures the demand-
ingness of the receiver role. The question is whether (as Sterelny suspects)
including hedgehog strategies might undermine the evolutionary robustness
of signaling systems.
Our second concern pertaining to evolutionary responsiveness parallels a
well-known evolutionary hypothesis: the so-called Red Queen effect. In com-
petitive relationships such as predator-prey or parasite-host, the Red Queen
hypothesis states that species will be constantly adapting and evolving in re-
sponse to one another just to “stay in the same place” (van Valen 1973). This
should also be the case in competitive signaling situations—such as predator-
2. It is worth noting here that the ‘hedgehog’ strategy in this Lewis signaling game is in
many ways analogous to the risk dominant ‘hare’ response in stag hunt games. Playing
hare instead of stag allows the agent to avoid disaster but only guarantees the individual
a mediocre payoff. Thus, the issues and trade-offs associated with the hedgehog strategy
are general concerns not confined to just the Lewis signaling games. Thanks to Kim
Sterelny for helping us better see this connection.
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prey signaling systems or courtship displays among conspecifics. Signalers
and receivers come to not just update their strategies but do so at faster or
slower rates depending on the nature of the strategic encounter they are en-
twined in.3
It might seem that independent update rates should play no role in Lewis
signaling games (along with games of common interest more generally).
However, any realistic interpretation of the Lewis signaling game makes
it plausible to consider asymmetry in evolutionary responsiveness as likely,
if not the norm. First, as argued, the precise cognitive mechanisms and pro-
cedures employed by senders and receivers are likely to be different. Differ-
ent systems (or systems used differently) will admit to different degrees of
plasticity and evolvability and will have a different set of crosscutting tasks
and utilities exerting distinct demands and pressures. Quick and easy signal-
ing responses will have pathways of update and adaptation different from
the (typically) more complex set of systems that appropriate receiver re-
sponses require. We should not assume that the evolution of sender and re-
ceiver strategies always proceeds at the same pace.
Finally, there is at least some evidence of a basic asymmetry between
sender and receiver roles in the literature on great ape communication. For
example, Hobaiter and Byrne (2014) stress the great sophistication and flex-
ibility on the receiver side of Chimpanzee gestural communication, while
Seyfarth and Cheney (2003) discuss how greater inferential sophistication
on the receiver side is a feature of many primate communication systems.
While these findings do not directly support the structural and evolutionary
responsiveness concerns, they show that real-life sender and receiver strate-
gies (in our near biological cousins at least) exhibit important differences,
suggesting cognitive asymmetries compatible with those concerns.
In summary then, there is reason to consider two structural modifications
to the Lewis signaling game as especially salient to the issue of responsive-
ness: the addition of ‘hedgehog’ strategies for receivers and differing rates
of change in sender and receiver strategies.
4. TheModel. The evolutionary model we use as the basis for our analysis
is the pure strategy 2  2  2Lewis signaling game,with the two-population
discrete-time replicator dynamics. Exact components of the model include
two states of the world (L and R), a world-observing signaler with two pos-
3. An example of two groups adapting and evolving at different rates can be found in
Richard Dawkins’s discussion of his famous Life-Dinner principle (Dawkins and Krebs
1979). While we expect both predator and prey to adapt to each other, Dawkins claims
the prey species will come to evolve at a faster rate than the predator species because of
the different selection pressures exerted on both species. Failing to adapt quickly enough
for the predator means going hungry for an extra day, while failing to adapt for the prey
means death.
1072 CARL BRUSSE AND JUSTIN BRUNER
sible signals (V1 and V2), and a signal-observing receiver with two possible
actions (AL and AR).
If the receiver’s action matches the state of the world, then both signaler
and receiver get a fixed positive success payoff; otherwise, their payoff is
zero. Signalers and receivers both have four pure strategies available to them
(see table 1).
For the evolutionary model, the proportions of the different strategies
within sender and receiver populations are initially randomly generated.
The fitness of each strategy at a time period t is determined by the compo-
sition of the opposing population and the payoff associated with each strat-
egy pairing. The proportion of each strategy at play in the next time period
t 1 1 is determined by the standard discrete-time replicator dynamics. For
the sender population this is
Xi(t 1 1) 5 Xi(t)
FSi
FS
,
where Xi is the proportion of senders using the ith sender strategy at a given
point in time, FSi is the fitness of that strategy, and FS is the average sender
strategy fitness. Likewise, for receivers
Yj(t 1 1) 5 Yj(t)
FRj
FR
,
where Yj is the proportion of receivers using the jth receiver strategy, FRj is
the fitness of that strategy, and FR is the average receiver strategy fitness.
This is repeated until the populations settle into an evolutionarily stable ar-
rangement. The update process is deterministic with no randomization or
mutation.
5. Modifications and Results. We introduce two novel modifications to
this model. First, we add a ‘hedgehog’ action AH for the receiver. Sec-
ond, we allow the rate of generational change of senders and receivers to
TABLE 1. SIGNALER AND RECEIVER STRATEGIES IN THE STAN-
DARD 2  2  2 COMMON INTEREST SIGNALING GAME
Strategy Description
S1 Signal V1 if L and signal V2 if R
S2 Signal V2 if L and signal V1 if R
S3 Signal V1 always
S4 Signal V2 always
S5 Act AL if V1 and act AR if V2
S6 Act AR if V1 and act AL if V2
S7 Act AL always
S8 Act AR always
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vary relative to one another. In addition, the bias of nature is varied, and we
investigate the effects these three departures from the Lewis 2  2  2
game have on the evolutionary significance of signaling systems.
5.1. Hedgehog Strategy. Turning to our first modification, the receiver
now has three possible actions upon observing the signal: AL, AR, and AH. As
before, a success payoff of 1 is received by both players in the case that the
receiver plays AL while the world is in state L or the receiver plays AR while
the world is in state R. A payoff of zero is received if AL or AR is played oth-
erwise. A payoff of H is received unconditionally if the receiver plays AH,
where the value of H is between 0 and 1. The sender has four familiar pure
strategies, whereas the receiver now has five (for simplicity we omit condi-
tional strategies involving AH).
To adapt the earlier forager story, we can imagine the sender and receiver
as an egalitarian hunting party, and the game as a situation in which the
sender remotely observes the location of a valuable prey animal (left or right)
and calls out to the receiver. The receiver is initially unable to observe the
prey but can choose to go left or go right (catching the prey if he goes in the
matching direction) or alternatively to abandon the hunt in order to obtain
a less valuable resource he does not need help from the sender to acquire
(the hedgehog strategy). Varying the prior probability of the world is equiv-
alent to it being in a situation in which it is systematically more likely that the
prey is to the left or the right.
In the simple unbiased 2  2  2 signaling game, one of the two signal-
ing equilibria is guaranteed to be reached under the replicator dynamics
(Huttegger 2007). In our notation, these equilibria are S1-S1 and S2-S2. In-
creasing the bias of the world (i.e., making L more probable than R or vice
versa) will undermine this, with an increasing proportion of populations in-
stead collapsing to a pooling equilibrium. This will occur when there are ini-
tially few conditional signaling strategies (such as S1) in the sender popu-
lation. In such situations, receivers do best to simply perform the act that is
most appropriate for the more likely state of the world. The incentive for
senders to adopt a signaling system then disappears, and the community is
locked into a pooling equilibrium.
Not surprisingly, we find a similar effect with the hedgehog strategy as
values of H, the payoff for AH, become significant. The hedgehog strategy
provides the receiver with an additional unilateral response and is able to at-
tract some proportion of initial populations away from the signaling equilib-
ria when H is in excess of 0.5 (i.e., the average payoff for ‘guessing’). This
result, for an unbiased world, is illustrated in figure 1.4
4. Note that the exact range of this effect, including the point at which the effect be-
comes significant and the y-intercept, are artifacts of the number of world-states and
strategies in the model and therefore not general.
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We observe a more surprising result when the bias and H are varied in
combination. Figure 2 shows the results of varying bias for different values
of H. As expected, when H is set to zero signaling is guaranteed when na-
ture is unbiased and is less likely to emerge as bias increases. As before,
when the hedgehog strategy pays significant dividends (H > 0:5) signaling
is less likely when nature is unbiased. For these high values of H, however,
increasing nature’s bias does not immediately reduce the likelihood of sig-
naling. In fact we observe a ‘plateau’ followed by an increase in signaling
behavior, peaking at the point where bias is equal to the value of H, that is,
at P(L) 5 H and at P(L) 5 1 2 H . Within these bounds, all populations
reach either a signaling equilibrium or a Hedgehog equilibrium (in which
all receivers have adopted the hedgehog strategy), but for values of H out-
Figure 2. Effect of hedgehog strategy and bias of nature on number of simulations
reaching signaling equilibria.
Figure 1. Effect of varying hedgehog payoffH on the number of simulations reach-
ing signaling equilibria.
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side of this interval traditional pooling instead occurs when the population
fails to reach a signaling convention.
5.2. Generational Asymmetry. We now turn to our second modifica-
tion of the Lewis signaling framework in which we introduce a generational
asymmetry.We introduced a ‘slow-down factor’ Z to the replicator dynamics
in order to control the rate at which sender and receiver populations change
over time. Composition of the sender and receiver populations is now gov-
erned by the following equations:
Xi(t 1 1) 5 (1 2 ZS)Xi(t)
FSi
FS
1 Xi(t)ZS ,
Yj(t 1 1) 5 (1 2 ZR)Yj(t)
FRj
FR
1 Yj(t)ZR:
Note that when both ZR 5 0 and ZS 5 0 the above equations are simply the
standard replicator dynamics. However, the rate of change is reduced as these
values are increased; for example, setting ZS 5 :5 halves the rate of change
for sender strategies. Setting ZR to 1 (while holding ZS fixed at 0) means the
composition of the receiver population remains fixed, and only the sender
population is allowed to evolve.
Introducing this generational asymmetry between senders and receivers
has the effect of making signaling more likely when sender strategies evolve
faster than receiver strategies. This is illustrated in figure 3, where, for var-
Figure 3. Effect of generational asymmetry and bias of nature on number of sim-
ulations reaching signaling equilibria.
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ious levels of bias, senders (receivers) are slowed down to half and one-tenth
speeds while receivers (senders) are left unaltered.
Slowing the evolution of the sender population leads to more pooling be-
cause, as before, receivers facing a sender population consisting of few con-
ditional signalers will do best to simply perform that act that is best suited
for themore likely state of theworld. As figure 3 illustrates, this effect ismore
pronounced for high levels of bias. Slowing the evolution of the receiver pop-
ulation has the opposite effect. Senders now have time to adopt the best sep-
arating strategy given the initial mix of receiver strategies. Once this occurs,
the receiver population slowly responds, and the end result is a robust signal-
ing system. By a similar logic, it is easy to see that a faster-evolving sender
population also mitigates against the effect of receiver hedgehog strategies.5
6. Discussion. We have explored a few well-motivated departures from
the highly idealized and simple Lewis signaling game typically considered
in the literature. As shown in section 4, breaking the symmetry between send-
ers and receivers often significantly reduces the likelihood that a separating
equilibrium emerges. For one, providing receivers with a safe third option
that allows them to secure a decent payoff regardless of the state of the world
significantly reduces the size of the basin of attraction of the separating equi-
librium. Likewise, separating is a remote possibility when receivers outpace
senders in the race to adapt.
However, the situation is less bleak when senders evolve at a faster pace
than receivers.6 Interestingly, many scholars in the animal communications
literature have noted that such a response asymmetry holds between sender
and receiver when the interests of the parties partially conflict. For instance,
Owren, Rendall, and Ryan (2010) note that senders can easily adapt their sig-
naling behavior while receivers for the most part have responses to the stim-
uli produced by senders that are more difficult to change. This has lead some
5. This also helps to explain the twin-peaked curves in fig. 2. In the region of the peaks
the uptake rate of the fittest pooling strategy (either hedgehog or traditional) is reduced
by the relatively high fitness of its near rival, as the average fitness FR in the denominator
of the replicator dynamics will be closer to that of the superior FRj strategy. For some
populations (depending on proportions) this competition will allow more time for con-
ditional sending strategies to tip the fitness balance toward conditional receiving strate-
gies instead.
6. This effect is somewhat robust. For instance, Hofbauer and Huttegger (2008) find that
under the selection-mutation dynamics signaling conventions are possible when the mu-
tation rate of the receiver population exceeds the mutation rate of the sender population.
Note that large mutation rates in effect slow down the rate of evolution of a given pop-
ulation. Thus, one way of interpreting their results is that signaling is likely to occur
when the receiver population is relatively unresponsive to the sender population.
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to the conclusion that signaling primarily involves the manipulation of re-
ceivers by senders.
Yet this leaves us with an evolutionary puzzle. If there is a partial conflict
of interest between sender and receiver, what prevents receivers from in-
creasing the speed at which they adapt to the behavior of the sender? In other
words, what explains the absence of an evolutionary arms race between
sender and receiver? Partial-conflict-of-interest settings are the exact circum-
stances to which we would expect the Red Queen hypothesis to apply. We
believe the results of this article may form the basis of a novel explanation
for this puzzling phenomena. Recall that when the interests of sender and re-
ceiver are perfectly aligned, it is actually in the interest of both parties for the
sender population to ‘take the lead’ and evolve at the faster rate, as doing so
ensures the community is more likely to hit upon a mutually beneficial sig-
naling system.
Yet senders and receivers rarely find themselves engaged exclusively in
either common or conflict-of-interest signaling games. As is well known by
any parent, not all signaling interactions between relatives are free of con-
flict. Likewise, agents whose interests are typically thought to be partially
opposed, such as two potential mates, may frequently engage in common in-
terest signaling games in contexts unrelated to mating. The point here is that
a variety of distinct strategic scenarios can hold between sender and receiver.
There is no principled reason to think all interactions will involve the perfect
alignment of interests or sizable conflict. Nor is it sensible to assume that
communicative strategies will always be fine-grained enough for scenario-
by-scenario optimization.
If this is correct, then when a sizable proportion of interactions between
sender and receiver involve no or very low conflict of interest, the genera-
tional asymmetry result from the previous section may hold to some degree.
Both sender and receiver profit when the sender population evolves at a fas-
ter rate than the receiver population. Receivers in this context do best to limit
how responsive they are to senders so as to ensure the emergence of informa-
tive signaling systems in those cases in which their interests do overlap.
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